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R
ecently, countries from China 
and Brazil to Malaysia and 
South Africa have passed 
laws promoting the patenting of 
publicly funded research [1,2], and 
a similar proposal is under legislative 
consideration in India [3]. These 
initiatives are modeled in part on the 
United States Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 
[4]. Bayh-Dole (BD) encouraged 
American universities to acquire 
patents on inventions resulting from 
government-funded research and 
to issue exclusive licenses to private 
firms [5,6], on the assumption that 
exclusive licensing creates incentives 
to commercialize these inventions. 
A broader hope of BD, and the 
initiatives emulating it, was that 
patenting and licensing of public sector 
research would spur science-based 
economic growth as well as national 
competitiveness [6,7]. And while it 
was not an explicit goal of BD, some 
of the emulation initiatives also aim 
to generate revenues for public sector 
research institutions [8].
We believe government-supported 
research should be managed in 
the public interest. We also believe 
that some of the claims favoring 
BD-type initiatives overstate the 
Act’s contributions to growth in US 
innovation. Important concerns and 
safeguards—learned from nearly 30 
years of experience in the US—have 
been largely overlooked. Furthermore, 
both patent law and science have 
changed considerably since BD 
was adopted in 1980 [9,10]. Other 
countries seeking to emulate that 
legislation need to consider this new 
context.
Overstating Claims
On a positive note, the BD Act required 
different agencies that funded US 
research and development to adopt 
more consistent policies about 
ownership of patents arising from 
federal funding [5]. One of BD’s 
intended virtues involved transferring 
default patent ownership from 
government to parties with stronger 
incentives to license inventions. BD 
assigned ownership to institutions, such 
as universities, nonprofits, and small 
businesses, although it could just as 
easily have opted for individual grant 
and contract recipients.
Nevertheless, many advocates of 
adopting similar initiatives in other 
countries overstate the impact of BD in 
the US. Proponents note The Economist’s 
2002 claim that the Act was “[p]ossibly 
the most inspired piece of legislation 
to be enacted in America over the past 
half-century” [11]. They also cite data 
(originally used by US proponents 
of the Act) on the low licensing rates 
for the 28,000 patents owned by the 
US government before BD to imply 
that the pre-BD legal regime was not 
conducive to commercialization [12]. 
But as Eisenberg [5] has argued, that 
figure is misleading because the sample 
largely comprised patents (funded by 
the Department of Defense) to which 
firms had already declined the option 
of acquiring exclusive title. Moreover, 
these figures are of questionable 
relevance to debates about public 
sector research institutions, because 
most of the patents in question were 
based on government-funded research 
conducted by firms, not universities 
or government labs [13]. Finally, and 
most importantly, the narrow focus 
on licensing of patented inventions 
ignores the fact that most of the 
economic contributions of public 
sector research institutions have 
historically occurred without patents—
through dissemination of knowledge, 
discoveries, and technologies by means 
of journal publications, presentations 
at conferences, and training of students 
[6,14,15].
Throughout the 20th century, 
American universities were the nation’s 
most powerful vehicles for the diffusion 
of basic and applied research results 
[16], which were generally made 
available in the public domain, where 
industry and other public sector 
researchers could use them. These 
activities were central to the rise of 
American technological success broadly 
and to the growth of knowledge-based 
industries, such as biotechnology and 
information technology, in particular.
Public sector research institutions 
also relied on generous public funding 
for academic research—from a highly 
diverse group of federal funding 
agencies—which grew dramatically 
after the Second World War, and on 
the availability of venture capital to 
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foster the development of early-stage 
ideas [6]. These and other unique 
features of the US research and 
development system explain much 
more about innovation in the US after 
BD than the rules about patenting that 
BD addressed.
In the pre-BD era, discoveries 
emanating from public research 
were often commercialized without 
patents, although academic institutions 
occasionally patented and licensed 
some of their publicly funded 
inventions well before BD, and these 
practices became increasingly common 
in the 1970s [17]. Since the passage 
of the Act in 1980, US academic 
patenting, licensing, and associated 
revenues have steadily increased. BD 
accelerated this growth by clarifying 
ownership rules, by making these 
activities bureaucratically easier to 
administer, and by changing norms 
toward patenting and licensing at 
universities [6]. As a result, researchers 
vested with key patents sometimes 
took advantage of exclusive licenses 
to start spin-off biotechnology 
companies. These trends, together 
with anecdotal accounts of “successful” 
commercialization, constitute the 
primary evidence used to support 
emulating BD in other countries. 
However, it is a mistake to interpret 
evidence that patents and licenses have 
increased as evidence that technology 
transfer or commercialization of 
university technology has increased 
because of BD.
Although universities can and do 
patent much more in the post-BD 
era than they did previously, neither 
overall trends in post-BD patenting and 
licensing nor individual case studies of 
commercialized technologies show that 
BD facilitated technology transfer and 
commercialization. Empirical research 
suggests that among the few academic 
patents and licenses that resulted in 
commercial products, a significant 
share (including some of the most 
prominent revenue generators) could 
have been effectively transferred by 
being placed in the public domain or 
licensed nonexclusively [6,18].
Another motivation for BD-type 
legislation is to generate licensing 
revenues for public sector research 
institutions. In the US, patents are 
indeed a source of revenues for some 
universities, but aggregate revenues are 
small. In 2006, US universities, hospitals, 
and research institutions derived 
US$1.85 billion from technology 
licensing compared to US$43.58 billion 
from federal, state, and industry funders 
that same year [19], which accounts for 
less than 5% of total academic research 
dollars. Moreover, revenues were 
highly concentrated at a few successful 
universities that patented “blockbuster” 
inventions [20].
A recent econometric analysis using 
data on academic licensing revenues 
from 1998 to 2002 suggests that, 
after subtracting the costs of patent 
management, net revenues earned by 
US universities from patent licensing 
were “on average, quite modest” nearly 
three decades after BD took effect. 
This study concludes that “universities 
should form a more realistic perspective 
of the possible economic returns from 
patenting and licensing activities” [21]. 
Similarly, the head of the technology 
licensing office at MIT (and former 
President of the Association of 
University Technology Managers) notes 
that “the direct economic impact of 
technology licensing on the universities 
themselves has been relatively small 
(a surprise to many who believed 
that royalties could compensate 
for declining federal support of 
research)… [M]ost university licensing 
offices barely break even” [22].
It is thus misleading to use data 
about the growth of academic patents, 
licenses, and licensing revenues 
as evidence that BD facilitated 
commercialization in the US. And 
it is little more than a leap of faith 
to conclude that similar legislation 
would automatically promote 
commercialization and technology 
transfer in other, very different, 
socioeconomic contexts.
Sources of Concern
What have we learned from the US 
experience with BD? Because the Act 
gives recipients of government research 
funds almost complete discretion 
to choose what research to patent, 
universities can patent not only those 
inventions that firms would fail to 
commercialize or use without exclusive 
rights, but also upstream research tools 
and platforms that do not need patent 
protection and exclusive licensing to be 
adopted by industry [6,9,10].
For example, while the patented 
technologies underlying recombinant 
DNA were fundamentally important 
for biotechnology and generated 
ample revenues for Stanford, the 
University of California, Columbia 
University, and City of Hope Medical 
Center [6], the patenting and 
licensing of these research platforms 
and technologies were not necessary 
for commercialization. Both the 
Cohen-Boyer patents for recombinant 
DNA and the Axel patents on 
cotransformation were rapidly adopted 
by industry even though neither 
invention came with the BD “carrot” of 
an exclusive right. The Cohen-Boyer 
patents reportedly contributed to 2,442 
new products and US$35 billion in 
sales. Its licensing revenues to Stanford 
University and the University of 
California San Francisco were US$255 
million [23]. With 34 firms licensing 
the technology, the Axel patents 
earned US$790 million in royalties for 
Columbia University over the patent 
period (Colaianni and Cook-Deegan, 
unpublished data). While the patenting 
and licensing of these inventions clearly 
enriched the universities involved, 
there is no reason to believe that 
nonexclusive licensing (as opposed 
to simple dedication to the public 
domain) deterred commercialization 
of the invention(s). In fact, Columbia 
University justified efforts to extend 
the life of its Axel patents not because 
such extension would improve 
commercialization, but rather because 
it protected royalty income that would 
be channeled back into its educational 
and research mission.
While BD gave those conducting 
publicly funded research the discretion 
to patent fundamental technologies, 
changes in US patent law since 1980 
provided the means, by expanding 
eligibility standards to include basic 
research and research tools. These 
trends have been notable in the 
biotechnology and information 
technology sectors [24,25]. A widely 
watched, recent consequence of this 
shift involves the suite of University 
of Wisconsin patents on embryonic 
stem cell lines [26–28]. Biotechnology 
firms eager to do research on stem 
cells have complained about the 
excessive licensing fees that Wisconsin 
charges (as well as about “reach 
through” provisions that call for 
royalties on any product developed 
from research on embryonic stem 
cells, and impose restrictions on 
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commercialization, these patents on 
basic research platforms constitute a 
veritable tax on commercialization 
[30]. Nor were these efforts to tax 
future innovation unprecedented, 
as the example of recombinant 
DNA shows. The Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation’s extension of 
licensing terms to academic research 
institutions [31] and its imposition 
of restrictions on use became 
especially controversial because these 
measures went beyond the Cohen-
Boyer precedent. The manager of 
recombinant DNA licensing at Stanford 
quipped, “[W]hether we licensed it or 
not, commercialization of recombinant 
DNA was going forward…a 
nonexclusive licensing program, at its 
heart, is really a tax…But it’s always 
nice to say ‘technology transfer’” [32].
The broad discretion given to 
publicly funded research institutions 
to patent upstream research raises 
concern about patent thickets, where 
numerous patents on a product lead 
to bargaining breakdowns and can 
blunt incentives for downstream 
research and development (R&D) 
[33,34]. Barriers to bundling 
intellectual property necessary for 
R&D become higher in frontier 
interdisciplinary research areas, such 
as synthetic biology, microarrays, and 
nanobiotechnology, because they 
draw upon multiple fields, some of 
which may be likelier than others to 
form thickets over time [9,10,32,35]. 
Although there is some evidence that 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
firms may be able to avoid thickets 
through secret infringement or by 
“off-shoring” research to countries 
with fewer patent restrictions [36], 
secret infringement and the transfer 
of R&D to other countries are hardly 
tactics that government policy should 
encourage.
The problems that BD has raised 
for the biopharmaceutical industry 
are dwarfed by the problems it has 
raised for information technology. 
Universities may too often take a “one 
size fits all” approach to patenting 
research results, notwithstanding 
the evidence that patents and 
exclusive licensing play a much more 
limited role in the development of 
information technology than they do 
in the pharmaceutical sector [37]. 
In testimony to the US Congress, a 
prominent information technology 
firm complained that aggressive 
university patenting impeded both 
product development and university–
industry collaboration, which 
encouraged companies to find other 
university partners, often outside the 
US [38]. Expressing similar concerns 
in a proposal to explore alternatives 
to the BD model, officials from the 
Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation 
(the leading US foundation supporting 
entrepreneurship research) recently 
argued that “Technology Transfer 
Offices (TTOs) were envisioned 
as gateways to facilitate the flow of 
innovation but have instead become 
gatekeepers that in many cases 
constrain the flow of inventions and 
frustrate faculty, entrepreneurs, and 
industry” [39].
These problems have not escaped 
the attention of funding agencies, 
most notably the US National Institutes 
of Health (NIH), which has issued 
guidelines stating that patents should 
be sought, and exclusive licenses 
should be restricted, only when 
they are necessary for purposes of 
commercialization [40,41]. Beyond 
such hortatory guidelines, however, 
US funding agencies retain very 
limited authority to guide the 
patenting and licensing practices of 
publicly funded research institutions. 
Under BD, agencies can declare 
particular areas off-limits to patenting 
only when they find “exceptional 
circumstances.” Moreover, they 
must present this decision to the 
Department of Commerce, the primary 
administrator of BD. The “exceptional 
circumstances” authority has only 
rarely been used [30]. However, when 
exclusive licensing demonstrably 
impeded commercialization, the 
funding agencies did not intervene by 
exercising their authority to mandate 
additional licensing. Their reluctance 
to take such action stems in part from 
the realization that, under the BD 
regime as enacted, any mandate could 
immediately be challenged (and its 
effect stayed) pending the outcome of 
protracted litigation [30].
Some of the top US universities 
have themselves begun to recognize 
the difficulties that overly aggressive 
proprietary behavior can engender, 
as demonstrated by their March 2007 
declaration highlighting “Nine Points 
to Consider in Licensing University 
Technology” [42]. How this declaration 
will affect university behavior is difficult 
to predict. Moreover, the “Nine Points” 
declaration focuses almost entirely 
on licensing and fails to address 
how universities should determine 
whether patents are necessary for 
commercialization in the first instance.
BD has also led to downstream 
concerns. The BD framework makes 
minimal reciprocal demands from 
licensees of government-funded 
technologies, and neither universities 
nor government agencies have sought 
to include requirements that products 
derived from these inventions be sold 
to consumers on reasonable terms 
[43]. Nor do funders require either 
disclosure of follow-on investments, 
so that prices might reflect the 
private contribution to development 
or the avoidance of abusive or 
anticompetitive marketing practices 
[43–47].
Some have raised concerns that 
the Act contributed to a change in 
academic norms regarding open, 
swift, and disinterested scientific 
exchange [48,49]. For example, in 
a survey to which 210 life science 
companies responded, a third of the 
companies reported disputes with 
their academic collaborators over 
intellectual property, and 30% noted 
that conflicts of interest had emerged 
when university researchers became 
involved with another company [50]. 
Nearly 60% of agreements between 
academic institutions and life science 
companies required that university 
investigators keep information 
confidential for more than six 
months—considerably longer than 
the 30 to 60 days that NIH considered 
reasonable—for the purpose of filing 
a patent [50]. Similarly, in a survey 
of life science faculties at universities 
receiving the most NIH funding, 
nearly a third of the respondents 
receiving a research-related gift (e.g., 
biomaterials, discretionary funds, 
research equipment, trips to meetings, 
or support for students) reported 
that the corporate donor wanted pre-
publication review of any research 
articles generated from the gift; and 
19% reported that the companies 
expected ownership of all patentable 
results from the funded research [51].
Although the surveys discussed 
above were conducted in the mid 
to early 1990s, their findings appear 
robust over time. In a more recent PLoS Biology  |  www.plosbiology.org PLoS Biology  |  www.plosbiology.org 2081 October 2008  |  Volume 6  |  Issue 10  |  e262
Governments adopting laws styled 
after the US BD Act should be vigilant 
to ensure that the public’s interests 
are served. In commercializing publicly 
funded research, a number of safeguards 
on patenting and licensing practices 
should be built into any law or its 
regulatory implementation.
No Exclusive Licensing Unless 
Necessary for Commercialization 
Any BD-style legislation should be 
founded on the principle that publicly 
funded research should not be 
exclusively licensed unless it is clear 
that doing so is necessary to promote 
the commercialization of that research. 
Public sector institutions should not, for 
example, exclusively license research tools 
that were developed with public funding 
if those tools can instead be used off the 
shelf by others. Where exclusive licenses 
are not required for commercialization, 
one may ask whether universities and 
public sector labs should be patenting 
research at all. Will encouragement of 
patenting and nonexclusive licensing, 
as in the Cohen-Boyer model discussed 
above, help or hurt researchers, firms, 
and the public in developing countries? 
Even nonexclusive licenses will tax 
downstream users, although presumably 
with lower rents and transaction costs 
and more procompetitive effects. 
As suggested above, revenues from 
licensing academic inventions are likely 
to be minuscule for most institutions, 
and aggressive university patenting can 
have other deleterious effects. A robust 
research exemption can ward off some 
of the problems potentially associated 
with restrictive licensing of upstream 
inventions [62].
Transparency
The legislation should ensure 
transparency in the patenting and 
licensing of publicly funded research. 
Public accountability should follow 
public funding. Institutions that engage 
in patenting and licensing should 
be required to report or make public 
all information that is necessary to 
determine whether they are reasonably 
serving the public interest. Such 
information may include the number 
of patents and licenses obtained, the 
funds expended on patenting and 
licensing activities, licensing revenues, 
and the key terms (e.g., exclusive or 
nonexclusive, humanitarian access, 
research exemption, definition of 
market segmentation or field of use, 
performance milestones, and march-
in rights) of licenses. The lack of a 
transparency mandate is a key flaw of the 
BD Act that should not be replicated.
Government Authority To Issue 
Additional Licenses 
Where licensing arrangements for 
publicly funded research do not achieve 
public interest objectives, governmental 
authorities must have power to override 
such licenses and to grant licenses to 
additional or alternative parties [9,10,43]. 
In the US, this authority is formally 
embodied in the government’s “march-
in” rights under BD, but this power 
has never been exercised. Petitions to 
invoke it have been made a few times 
[46,47,63,64], but they have never 
been granted, and because of the 
administrative disincentives built into BD, 
this power is unlikely ever to be used [30]. 
To avoid this result, legislatures must 
develop standards to ensure that march-
in rights or comparable authority will be 
exercised when public interest objectives 
are not otherwise attained. 
In evaluating licensing options, those 
receiving government research funding 
could also be required to consider the 
option of licensing patented inventions 
to a “technology trust,” that is, a 
commons that would ensure designated 
inventions remained available to all 
interested parties on predetermined 
terms. Such a commons could enable 
the pooling of socially useful bundles of 
technology, particularly research tools 
and health technologies for neglected 
or rare diseases. Governments might 
also consider reducing or waiving patent 
application and maintenance fees for such 
inventions when they are made broadly 
available for research and humanitarian 
application, without royalty, for a specific 
geographical area or field of use.
Government Use Rights 
The government should retain an 
automatic right to use any invention 
arising from its funding. Under BD, 
the US government has an automatic 
“nonexclusive, nontransferable, 
irrevocable, paid-up license” [65] to 
use any invention developed with 
government funds. Typically, however, it 
does not invoke such a license and often 
pays monopoly prices for products that 
it funded. The US experience shows the 
importance both of establishing that the 
government should be provided with an 
automatic license in products resulting 
from its funding and of elaborating 
standards to ensure such licenses 
are actually exercised in appropriate 
circumstances.
From a broader perspective, 
governments retain the right to use any 
invention, whether or not it arises from 
public funding, under international 
law [66]. Governments may choose to 
use patented inventions to promote 
public health [67], national security 
[66], or comparable objectives, while 
public-interest compulsory licenses 
may sometimes be granted to avoid 
abusive licensing practices or to ensure 
access to patented research products 
on reasonable terms and conditions 
[43,66]. Where publicly funded grantees 
fail to commercialize a technology 
appropriately or to foster its availability, 
the trigger for government use—under 
any enabling provision adopted in 
domestic law—must work better than 
the march-in right has under BD. 
Access to End Products 
Besides promoting commercialization, 
the government must ensure consumer 
access to end products. The public is 
entitled to expect that the inventions 
it paid for will be priced fairly. The US 
experience shows that a BD system that 
lacks mandatory rules concerning the 
affordability of end products will not 
deliver on this reasonable expectation 
[43–47]. As a condition of receiving 
a license to a government-funded 
invention, parties should be required 
to ensure that end products are made 
available to the public on reasonable 
terms and conditions. What constitutes 
“reasonable” will vary by national 
context, but it is important to ensure 
that the term is defined with enough 
precision to be enforceable. 
Licenses to government-funded 
inventions should presumptively include 
access-oriented licensing provisions that 
address humanitarian needs in other 
countries [68]. One such provision is an 
open license for production and sale 
of end products in (or to) developing 
countries in exchange for a fair royalty 
[69]. At the very least, when inventions 
have foreseeable applications in 
resource-poor regions, a plan for access 
in those regions should be explicitly 
incorporated into technology licensing.
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survey of university geneticists and 
life scientists, one in four reported 
the need to honor the requirements 
of an industrial sponsor as one of 
the reasons for denying requests for 
post-publication information, data, 
or materials [52]. This finding is also 
corroborated by a survey of US medical 
school faculty. In these settings, 
researchers most likely to report being 
denied research results or biomaterials 
by others were “those who have 
withheld research results from others” 
or who had patented or licensed their 
own inventions [53]. So the practices 
of patenting and licensing clearly 
encumber the openness of scientific 
exchange in universities.
Instituting Safeguards
Countries seeking to enhance the 
contributions of universities and 
public sector laboratories to social and 
economic development have numerous 
policy options. Many of these policies 
do not involve intellectual property 
rights at all, but rather look to provide 
funds for basic and applied research, 
subsidize scientific and engineering 
education, strengthen firms’ ability 
to assimilate university research, and 
invest in extension, experimentation, 
and diffusion activities [39,54,55]. But 
even policies focused on intellectual 
property management need not 
presume that patenting and exclusive 
licensing are the best options. For 
example, they may instead focus 
on placing by default or by strategy 
government-funded inventions 
into the public domain, creating a 
scientific commons, enabling collective 
management of intellectual property, 
or fostering open-source innovation 
[56–60]. Where greater commercial 
incentives seem necessary, the benefits 
of nonexclusive licensing should always 
be weighed against the social cost of 
exclusive licenses.
The appropriate array of policies will 
vary from country to country: there is 
no “one size fits all” solution. Based 
on our review above, we believe it is 
doubtful that the benefits of legislation 
closely modeled on BD would outweigh 
their costs in developing counties. 
For those countries that nonetheless 
decide to implement similar laws, 
the US experience suggests the 
crucial importance, at a minimum, of 
considering a variety of safeguards (see 
Box 1).
Conclusion
While policies supporting 
technological innovation and diffusion 
contribute to economic growth and 
development, the appropriate sets of 
policies to harness public sector R&D 
are highly context-specific. Much 
depends on factors such as the level of 
publicly funded research, the focus of 
such research on basic versus applied 
science, the capabilities of industry 
partners, and the nature of university–
industry linkages [54,55].
Recognizing these difficulties, 
reasonable minds may disagree about 
the likely impact of BD-type legislation 
elsewhere. Nevertheless, the present 
impetus for BD-type legislation in 
developing countries is fueled by 
overstated and misleading claims about 
the economic impact of the Act in 
the US, which may lead developing 
countries to expect far more than they 
are likely to receive. Moreover, political 
capital expended on rules of patent 
ownership may detract from more 
important policies to support science 
and technology, especially the need for 
public funding of research. Given the 
low level of public funding for research 
in many developing countries, for 
example, the focus on royalty returns 
at the expense of public goods may 
be misplaced [61]. Furthermore, it is 
unclear whether any of the positive 
impacts of BD in the US would arise in 
developing countries following similar 
legislation, absent the multiagency 
federal pluralism, the practically 
oriented universities, and other 
features of the US research system 
discussed above.
In any event, both the patent laws 
and patterns of scientific collaboration 
have changed substantially since BD 
was passed in 1980. To the extent that 
legislation governing the patenting and 
licensing of public sector research is 
needed in developing countries at all, 
it should reflect this new context rather 
than blindly importing a US model that 
is 30 years old.  
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